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ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of this article is to study the role of house banks in out-of-court reorganization. 
Banks are traditionally one of the most important financial resources for firms. Especially in financially 
difficult times like those we now face due to the coronavirus, it can make a difference whether a bank 
supports its clients and accompanies firms through a crisis or not. With the help of relationship lending 
theory, we review the existing literature on this topic. Next, based on empirical findings from Austrian 
banks, we derive implications for corporate practice. The empirical study covers a sample of 658 firm 
reorganizations in Austria. The data were collected anonymously by different banks processing the 
cases in their workout departments between January 2011 and December 2013. Correlation analysis 
and logistic regression were applied to analyze the data. The findings indicate that house banks, despite 
their relationship of trust, must be critical in their assessment of reorganization projects due to the 
danger of zombie lending. The four most important prerequisites for completing an out-of-court 
reorganization were a new loan, an open and proactive communication policy on the part of the 
distressed company, management changes, and a financial contribution from existing shareholders. 
The findings show that bank-supported out-of-court reorganization has a high probability of success. 
A recommendation to entrepreneurs is to respond rapidly to financial distress and maintain open 
communication with stakeholders, in particular banks. The findings indicate that the implementation 
of Directive (EU) 2019/1023 on preventive restructuring frameworks in the European Union is crucial 
to enable bank-led reorganizations. 
 
Keywords:  Reorganization, House bank, Out-of-court, Workout, Relationship Lending 
JEL Codes: G21, G34 
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I. Introduction 
A. Problem Statement 
The potentially devasting societal and economic outcomes of the coronavirus 
crisis currently threaten the survival of firms on a global scale (Wenzel et al., 2020). 
Financial crises will be frequent features of business life. Many companies will most 
likely struggle economically for many years. Failure rates and bankruptcies will 
therefore increase. 
SMEs are predominately funded with the help of banks in addition to equity 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). These businesses are also very dependent on their house 
banks since access to alternative funding sources is limited (Elsas and Krahnen, 
2004). In financial crises, this can lead to higher vulnerability and consequently to 
higher failure rates of SMEs than of larger companies (Kuecher et al., 2018; Box, 
2008). In financial distress, it can make a difference whether a bank supports its 
clients and accompanies firms through the crisis or not. Despite the fact that banks 
are willing to help (Couwenberg and Jong, 2006), they also play a key role in the 
reorganization process and discriminate very well between successful and 
unsuccessful firms (Huang et al., 2015). Regarding reorganization, companies can 
choose from an out-of-court reorganization, a workout, or a court-supervised 
procedure (Gilson, 1991). While an in-court supervised reorganization makes use of 
the insolvency law framework to remedy a firm’s financial distress, an out-of-court 
reorganization or a so-called workout or out-of-court settlement aims to address the 
distress before the opening of judicial proceedings or outside of insolvency 
proceedings and thus serves as an alternative to these, in consultation with creditors. 
Out-of-court solutions are handled privately, and therefore little is publicly known 
about the process of an out-of-court reorganization and what determines its success 
or failure. On the one hand, confidential handling is regarded positively by many 
creditors and debtors (Garrido, 2012); on the other hand, due to missing or limited 
legal principles on the process itself (which in most countries is not standardized), its 
outcome and success is hard to measure (European Commission, 2011). A healthy 
core of resources (employees, production knowhow, image, infrastructure, finance) 
forms the basis for a successful reorganization in both forms (Mayr and Mitter, 2015). 
Compared to bankruptcy, the workout option has so far been examined to only 
a limited extent in the existing literature with regard to its course and the resulting 
success rates (Blazy et al., 2014). Decker (2018) states that most articles in the 
literature on out-of-court reorganization are focused on the North American 
experience. Furthermore, she notes that existing studies mainly focus on large, stock-
based companies, whereas studies on SMEs’ negotiations are limited. In addition to 
the limited literature on out-of-court reorganization, there is also limited literature 
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regarding the role of banks in the workout process (Huang et al., 2015). Prior findings 
regarding the role of banks in out-of-court reorganization confirm that a stable house 
bank relationship increases the probability of out-of-court settlement (Blazy et al., 
2014; Couwenberg and Jong, 2006; Jostarndt and Sautner, 2010; Micucci and Rossi, 
2017). 
B. Aim of the Study 
The main purpose of this article is to study the role of house banks in out-of-
court reorganization with a strong focus on SMEs. Banks are traditionally one of the 
most important financial resources for small- and medium-sized firms. Especially in 
financially difficult times like those we face now due to the coronavirus, it can make 
a difference whether a bank supports its clients and accompanies firms through a 
crisis or not. With the help of relationship lending theory, we review the existing 
literature. Based on empirical findings from Austrian banks, we derive implications 
for corporate practice. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next 
section, the theoretical background, relationship lending theory, is presented. In the 
third section, the existing literature is reviewed. The fourth section presents the 
methodology, followed by the results and the discussion. The paper concludes with 
the central findings and recommendations for corporate practice. 
 
II. Theoretical Background 
The availability of external finance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
is a topic of significant research interest to academics and an important issue to policy 
makers around the globe (Berger and Udell, 2006). Different lending technologies or 
concepts therefore play a key role since government policies and national financial 
structures affect overall credit availability for SMEs (Huang et al., 2015). A lending 
technology represents a unique combination of primary information sources, 
screening and underwriting policies/procedures, a loan contract structure, and 
monitoring strategies/mechanisms. Lending technologies are often categorized into 
two types: transaction lending, which is based primarily on “hard,” quantitative data, 
and relationship lending, which is based significantly on “soft,” qualitative 
information (Berger and Udell, 2006). Relationship lending is primarily dominated 
by long-term commitments between lenders and borrowers and an informational 
monopoly by the lender (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). It is further characterized by close 
monitoring, renegotiability, and implicit long-term contractual agreements (Berlin 
and Mester, 1998). This relationship can only be ensured due to information 
production and repeated interactions over a longer period between a firm and its main 
bank (Elsas, 2005). A common finding is that large institutions have a comparative 
advantage in transaction lending to SMEs based on hard information, while small 
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institutions have a comparative advantage in relationship lending based on soft 
information (Berger and Udell, 1998). Inherent in small business lending is a more 
pronounced information asymmetry, since small and medium sized companies are 
more opaque than relatively transparent large firms (Hardee, 2008).  
However, relationship lending is not a dominant type of financing because it 
is also associated with costs (Elsas, 2005). In addition to existing monitoring costs 
for the lender, the borrower also faces switching costs due to obstacles in changing 
banks (Berger and Udell, 1998). Such changes become harder because of the 
information privilege of the main bank, which induces bargaining power due to its 
special status with respect to the locked-in situation of the lender. Relationship 
lending is very similar to the definition of the German house bank. We therefore use 
the terms relationship lending and house bank lending synonymously (Elsas and 
Krahnen, 1998). In addition to Germany, Japan is especially known for the 
importance of its banking relationships (Hoshi et al., 1990). 
According to Blazy et al. (2014), the average duration of a credit relationship 
between a firm and its main bank is approximately seven years. In addition, the 
existence of relationship lending is influenced by three determinants: borrower 
characteristics (e.g., size or quality of the firm, informational opaqueness, access to 
public debt or equity markets), bank characteristics (e.g., type of bank, such as a 
savings or cooperative bank versus a private bank), and market characteristics and 
conditions (e.g., regulation, market structure, competition) (Elsas, 2005). Another 
variable to assess the presence of a house bank relationship is a firm’s number of bank 
relationships (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). The “exclusivity of a bank relationship is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for relationship lending,” but it reduces 
direct competition between various banks and allows unique access to important 
information (Elsas, 2005). Bank size is another characteristic related to relationship 
lending, since larger banks are disadvantaged in relationship building with small 
firms (Berger et al., 2014). This disadvantage occurs because relationship lending is 
based on soft information collected through the strong exchange of communication 
between borrower and lender. Large banks have difficulties in processing and 
transmitting soft information due to long communication channels that increase 
information loss (Stein, 2002). 
A study from Harhoff and Körting (1998) finds that in the German lending 
market, the intensity of a relationship between a bank and an SME is affected not only 
by the length of the relationship and the number of the SME’s credit providers but 
also by mutual trust because trust improves the firm’s access to financing and reduces 
borrowing costs. Therefore, social interaction between a bank consultant and an 
entrepreneur is very important to stabilize the relationship; furthermore, this leads in 
a next step to lower interest rates, lower collateral requirements and an increase in 
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credit availability (Hirsch et al., 2018). Trust also has a positive effect on transaction 
costs, which are lowered, and helps economic interactions run more smoothly and for 
a longer time. Finally, trust helps prevent firms from switching banks (Hirsch et al., 
2018). 
Different lending technologies require different means of collecting 
information on the part of the bank. On the one hand, banks can collect information 
with transactional lending (hard facts) and, on the other hand, with relationship 
lending (soft facts). While relationship lending is based on “proprietary information 
collected, in particular, by the loan officer through repeated interaction with the firm 
over time” (Micucci and Rossi, 2017, p.343), transactional lending is mostly based 
on the evaluation of the firm’s financial statement. 
A common tool for banks to collect information is to monitor the client, which 
is a more or less automatic process, starting even before credit is granted and 
continuing after the credit is approved and paid to the client. Due to this continuous 
process of gathering and analyzing information over the entire life cycle of the firm-
bank relationship, monitoring costs can be reduced, and early warnings can be 
detected to allow for quick intervention in periods of distress (Micucci and Rossi, 
2017). Furthermore, monitoring increases the chance of renegotiation options in case 
of distress (Berlin and Mester, 1992). Another advantage of monitoring is to reduce 
moral hazard behavior on the part of clients, which is a key factor in cases of financial 
difficulty (Micucci and Rossi, 2017). According to Inoue et al. (2008) there is a need 
for monitoring and mediation by bank supervisors to react in a timely manner when 
a company falls into distress. Relationship lending and banking represents an 
approach to monitoring debtor firms and thereby reducing information asymmetries 
(Huang et al., 2015). However, “relationship strength and its consequences may be 
greater when banking markets are less competitive, because firms have fewer 
potential alternatives in the future event that their main bank tightens contract terms 
dramatically” (Berger et al., 2014, p.267). 
Nevertheless, if relationship lending becomes exaggerated, it can result in so-
called zombie lending or evergreening (Micucci and Rossi, 2017). This can happen 
when banks try to cover or at least postpone loan losses. They therefore might decide 
to sustain inefficient firms (Micucci and Rossi, 2017). Banks are at risk of postponing 
loan losses when the liquidation value of firms is higher than their ongoing concern 
value. What the literature describes as zombie lending can be basically understood as 
lending that keeps borrowers artificially alive through the extension of new credit. 
For instance, the strong relationship ties in Japan have been cited in the literature as 
an example of the perverse incentives for banks to continue lending to weak firms 
that can arise under relationship lending (Caballero et al., 2008). 
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House banks or main banks also play a key role in the reorganization of 
distressed companies. They might, for example, support a private workout plan or 
negotiate with other lending banks and the distressed firm (Blazy et al., 2014). 
Existing cross-country evidence shows that firms that maintain relationships with 
banks and banks themselves may behave differently in such relationships with regard 
to workout decisions (Ongena and Smith, 2000; Mian, 2006). Some banks may decide 
to restructure their loans to financially distressed firms, while others may not. 
Reasons for accompanying a firm through distress might be the close relationship 
between a firm and a bank and mutual trust. 
 
III. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Previous research confirms that banks play a decisive role in both the choice 
for an out-of-court restructuring and its success (e.g., Goto and Uchida, 2012; Blazy 
et al., 2014). Elsas and Krahnen (2002) and Huang et al. (2013) find in their research 
that a stable house bank relationship increases the probability of an out-of-court 
settlement. The study of Elsas and Krahnen (2002) uses a data sample of five German 
banks for the period 1992 to 1996 and focuses on medium-sized companies. 
According to the results, house banks have more collateral than arm's length banks, 
which are essentially subsidiary banks that have less information about the borrowing 
company. In reorganization, house banks and banks with more securities for 
outstanding loans support out-of-court restructuring more often than other banks. 
High collateral improves the bank's negotiating position not only vis-à-vis the debtor 
company but also vis-à-vis other creditors. This good negotiating position thus has a 
positive effect on the bank's decision to support an out-of-court restructuring. In the 
survey undertaken by Huang et al., (2013), which focuses on Taiwanese listed 
companies, a connection between the number of banks and the decision over the form 
of restructuring is identified, in addition to the influence of the intensity of the 
banking relationship: a lower number of bank relationships reduced information 
asymmetries and coordination problems and thus increased the probability of an out-
of-court restructuring. Couwenberg and Jong (2006) also confirm the role of the bank 
with regard to the decision on the form of reorganization: banks support companies 
in an out-of-court reorganization when the banks hold a high share of the total debt 
and thus risk or when they expect a high probability of success of the restructuring. 
H1: A strong relationship between a firm and its main bank (house bank) 
increases the likelihood of successfully completing a workout. 
 
Findings from Taiwanese listed firms facing severe financial distress indicate 
that bank relationships (relationship lending) significantly reduce the risk of filing for 
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bankruptcy but increase the probability of deb renegotiation (out-of-court settlement) 
(Huang et al., 2013). According to (Dahiya et al., 2003), prior banking relationships 
are valuable for lenders. On average, abnormal returns to banks upon the 
announcement of a borrower’s financial distress are significantly and negatively 
related to the existence of a prior past borrowing relationship with that borrower. This 
means that banks are more willing to help economically successful firms or at least 
companies with a higher chance of success. Couwenberg and Jong (2006) confirm 
the role of the bank in regard to deciding over the form of restructuring: banks support 
companies in an out-of-court reorganization when the banks hold a high share of the 
total debt and thus risk or when they expect a high probability of success of the 
restructuring. The size of the financing bank also plays an important role in 
reorganization. Berger et al. (2014) suggest that small banks are better able to form 
strong relationships. Due to their size, they have a large advantage in achieving 
closeness to the customer compared to big banks (Decker, 2018). Small banks 
typically engage in relationship lending. Smaller banks collect soft information 
through personal interaction between firm owners and bank loan officers (Hardee, 
2008). 
H2: Small banks are more successful in reorganizing firms. 
H2A: Relationship lending is more common in small banks. 
H2B: Relationship lending is important across the bank size distribution and 
contributes to a successful reorganization. 
 
Extensive cooperation between a main bank and a firm leads to the growth of 
the relationship (Huang et al., 2013). A stable and long-term relationship contributes 
to easier negotiations between the two: The longer the duration of the relationship 
between a firm and its main bank, the more information is available and the better are 
the possible market predictions. Another positive aspect of this relationship 
characteristic is the reduction of information asymmetry and hold-out problems 
(Gilson, 1991). Couwenberg and Jong (2006) indicate that banks have a powerful say 
in the restructuring activities of firms. Distressed companies are handed over to 
workout departments of banks (Kent, 1997). Large banks, in particular, have separate 
departments with workout experts to manage such cases (Couwenberg and Jong, 
2006). We therefore propose that banks guide firms in their restructuring effort and 
that their assistance is of crucial importance for the success of the restructuring. 
H3: A bank with experience in accompanying out-of-court reorganizations is 
more likely to complete a workout successfully than a bank without that expertise. 
 
Mayr et al.  House Banks in Out-of-court Reorganization 8 8 
The more information a bank has about its client, the better and faster a bank 
can act and suggest solutions. Collecting soft facts is easier for small banks because 
the communication channels in a small bank are shorter and more direct and lose less 
information through the layers of management (Berger et al., 2014). Therefore, banks 
may have an informational advantage over other stakeholders. This implies that banks 
are likely better informed about the financial status of their borrowers and thus will 
be able to take steps to reduce their loan exposures before the news of a borrower's 
distress becomes public (Dahiya et al., 2003). The better the information and the 
closer the relationship between a bank and a borrower, the more banks are willing to 
assist firms and this is the crucial importance to the success of the restructuring 
(Couwenberg and Jong, 2006). According to Dahiya et al. (2003), banks do not hold 
out on a restructuring effort, but actively participate by providing new funds, by 
easing certain conditions (especially extension of principal, a form of “softening”), 
as well as by tightening others (hasten repayments, additional collateral). If the 
available collateral does not cover the full amount of liability, then banks remain 
vulnerable, and in case of distress, a firm might force the bank to forgive part of the 
principal of a loan (Couwenberg and Jong, 2006). 
H4: If a firm receives support from a bank in the form of debt forgiveness or 
the issuance of new credit, it is more likely to complete a workout successfully. 
H4A: House banks are more willing to provide support in the form of debt 
forgiveness or the issuance of new credit. 
H4B: A house bank relationship is important for the availability of options 
such as debt forgiveness or the issuance of new credit and contributes to a successful 
reorganization. 
 
It is obvious that distressed companies need the support of external 
stakeholders, especially banks, that provide financial resources to reverse decline 
(Decker, 2018). Due to the firms’ lending situation, banks gain additional control over 
distressed firms, and various interests can come into conflict. Therefore, open and 
proactive communication between the managers of a company and the bank is 
essential to balance different aspirations and goals. Furthermore, how management 
communicates with the corporate bank advisor shapes the advisor’s impressions (in a 
positive or negative way) regarding provision of help in a situation of distress. 
According to Decker (2018), frequent and open communication between the two 
parties increases the likelihood of stakeholder support and a successful turnaround. 
H5: Open and proactive communication between a firm and its bank increases 
the likelihood of completing a workout successfully. 
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H5A: Relationship lending is more likely to encourage open and proactive 
communication between a company and its bank. 
H5B: A house bank relationship is important for open and proactive 
communication and contributes to successful reorganization. 
 
The willingness of a bank to help also depends on the role of managers, that 
is, whether management is cooperative (Dahiya et al., 2003), and of their knowhow 
in leading a firm in a crisis. Whereas corporate companies have financial departments 
with a board of experts, small firms either do not have boards to monitor and control 
management or boards play a different role, e.g., providing specific knowledge, 
giving access to a network of relations or perhaps even image-building (Couwenberg 
and Jong, 2006). According to Blazy et al. (2014), the success of a positive workout 
depends on whether management is at fault for the distress. Replacement of a leader 
can be harmful for a firm due to the loss of knowledge and expertise, but it can also 
be a first step towards a turnaround, especially if the house bank associates the 
company leader with the failed course of strategic action and the reasons for decline 
(Decker, 2018). In this situation, a change in management can then be a signal that 
the distressed company is honestly attempting to avoid failure. Jostarndt and Sautner 
(2008) emphasize that it is mostly banks, among a firm’s various stakeholders, that 
trigger management turnover. According to Hammann et al. (2009), this effect may 
be especially important in SMEs where personal relationships and individual 
responsibilities are essential. 
H6: A change in management can increase the likelihood of completing a 
workout successfully. 
H6A: A main bank is likely to encourage a change of management due to 
mutual trust and information exchange between company and bank. 
H6B: House bank status is important for initiating a management change and 
contributes to a successful reorganization. 
 
Furthermore, studies by Inoue et al. (2010) as well as by Jostarndt and Sautner 
(2008) identify a positive and significant correlation between the likelihood of a 
management change and the receipt of new capital when firms are in distress. 
Couwenberg and Jong (2006) confirm that shareholders are willing to contribute new 
funds (either equity or debt) in addition to support for management control or the 
provision of know-how. Prior findings from Mayr and Lixl (2019) indicate that the 
willingness of banks to support troubled firms is determined not only by their 
evaluation of the firms’ capability of meeting future market requirements but also by 
the willingness of the entrepreneur to personally contribute to restructuring. In 
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summary, it can be stated that a financial contribution to the restructuring by existing 
owners and shareholders can have a positive effect on the outcome of an out-of-court 
restructuring in two ways: On the one hand, the injection of financial resources can 
create the necessary slack for the reorganization (Jory and Madura, 2007). On the 
other hand, this (solidarity-based) financial support can, in the context of negotiations 
with the company's stakeholders, serve as the decisive factor in securing their consent 
to the reorganization. 
H7: Shareholder contributions can increase the likelihood of completing a 
workout successfully. 
H7A: Shareholders are more willing to invest equity in a company that is in 
financial distress if it benefits from relationship lending. 
H7B: A house bank relationship is important for attracting shareholder 
contributions and contributes to a successful reorganization. 
 
IV. Empirical Study 
A. Research Method 
Scientific research on out-of-court restructuring has so far been characterized 
by empirical-quantitative methods. Most of the papers identified in the literature 
review can be classified as quantitative. The predominant use of quantitative research 
methods in the context of out-of-court restructuring can be justified by the subject of 
the study. Recent studies mostly deal with listed companies, for which a large amount 
of publicly available information on restructuring is available due to reporting 
obligations (e.g., Goto and Uchida, 2012; Huang et al., 2013; Jostarndt and Sautner, 
2010). 
From a statistical point of view, hypothesis tests of the assumed relationships 
have mostly been carried out through bivariate and multivariate procedures, in 
particular regression analyses (e.g., Elsas and Krahnen, 2002; Brunner and Krahnen, 
2008; Blazy et al., 2014). The empirical method of the present study is also 
quantitative. First, the hypotheses were tested by using Fisher’s exact test. In addition, 
logistic regression was applied to build a model estimating the relationship of the 
dependent variable, namely, the outcome of the reorganization, with the various 
independent variables referring to the different hypotheses. Logistic regression is one 
of the structure-testing procedures with the help of which the dependence of a variable 
of interest on one or more independent variables (influencing factors) is examined. A 
prerequisite for its use is an idea of the interrelationships between the variables under 
investigation—in the present case the influence of several independent variables on 
the outcome (success or failure) of an out-of-court settlement—based on logic or 
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theoretical considerations. A company was identified as having been successfully 
restructured out-of-court if a restructuring agreement was concluded with the 
financing bank and any other creditors and the company continued as a going concern 
in the existing legal entity in the same or a similar form (Gilson et al., 1990; Jacobs 
et al., 2012). 
 
B. Sample Description 
For the quantitative study, cases of out-of-court restructurings were analyzed 
within the scope of anonymized data collected at 5 participating banks. The entire 
data sample contains 920 data records on out-of-court reorganization in Austria. A 
total of 658 cases where an active reorganization attempt had been made and the 
reorganization had already been completed were included in the final sample. Taking 
into account the selection criterion of material insolvency on the part of the affected 
firms, the participating institutions are fully informed about the cases pending in their 
workout departments. Possible distortions, which have to be taken into account when 
interpreting the results, may result from the fact that not all Austrian banks 
participated in the survey. 
With regard to the question of whether the participating banks represent the 
overall banking market in Austria, the following should be noted: The five banks are 
among the ten largest banks in Austria, including both banks with a centralized 
(Raiffeisen Bank International AG, Erste Bank AG, Erste Group Bank AG, Unicredit 
Bank Austria AG) and decentralized (Raiffeisen Landesbank OOE AG) 
organizational structure, and thus different levels of credit market access are taken 
into account. In addition, Raiffeisen Bank International AG and Erste Bank Group 
are highly internationally active banks, and Raiffeisen Landesbank OÖ AG is a bank 
that operates predominantly on a regional and national level and is classified as a 
small bank. Exclusively regional banks are not included in the sample. 
 
C. Descriptives 
Table 1 gives an overview of the frequency distribution of the dependent 
variable (outcome of the reorganization) and several independent variables (various 
reorganization measures and the type, size and status of the participating bank) that 
relate to the hypotheses in Chapter 3. The "cases" column shows the respective 
number of successfully or unsuccessfully reorganized companies in absolute numbers 
in relation to the respective independent variable. The determined percentages are 
displayed in the "in %" column and show the relative frequencies of successful and 
failed cases. 
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In brief, 409 (62 %) out of the 658 companies were positively restructured and 
continued to operate, while 249 (38 %) failed to achieve turnaround as a going 
concern. Out of the 409 successful cases, approximately 33 % received new credit 
from their own bank to reorganize the firm. More than 70 % of the successfully 
reorganized firms had open and proactive communication with the bank. In contrast, 
only approximately 39 % of the unsuccessful reorganizations had open and proactive 
communication between the firm and the (house) bank. 
 
Table 1: Frequency distribution 
 
Variables 
Successful 
reorganization  
Unsuccessful 
reorganization 
Total 
cases in % cases  in % cases  in % 
Outcome of the 
reorganization 
 409       62 %  249      38 %   658       100 % 
House bank relationship 240 59 % 161 65 % 401 61 % 
Small bank 40 10 % 8   3 % 48 7 % 
Expert bank 294 72 % 189 76 % 483 73 % 
Debt forgiveness 76 19 % 85 34 % 161 24 % 
New credit  134 33 % 46 18 % 180 27 % 
Open and proactive 
communication with the 
bank 
298 73 % 98 39 % 396 60 % 
Change in management 163 40 % 65 26 % 228 35 % 
Contribution from existing 
shareholders 
182 44 % 51 20 % 233 35 % 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the size of the underlying companies in terms of 
turnover. Approximately one-quarter are of micro size (up to 2 million €), one-quarter 
are of small size (up to 10 million €), and one-quarter are of medium size (up to 2 
million €), respectively; therefore, in sum, 80 % of the reorganization cases are SMEs. 
 
Table 2: Turnover of companies in reorganization 
 
Sales Cases Percent Cum. Percent 
0 – 2 million € 185 28.3 % 28.3 % 
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2 – 10 million € 172 26.3 % 54.7 % 
10 – 50 million € 164 25.1 % 79.8 % 
At least 50 million € 132 20.2 % 100 % 
 
 
V. Results 
In the first step, the bivariate results of a one-sided Fisher's exact test are 
presented. The significance level for all tests is 5 %. Table 3 shows for each of the 
main hypotheses (H1 to H7) a short version of the respective hypothesis, the expected 
influence of the underlying variable on the success of the reorganization ( for 
increasing,  for decreasing) and the one-sided p-value of Fisher’s exact test. For 
some hypotheses (H1 and H4), the result was statistically significant, but the sign was 
opposite to the expected one; therefore, the column remark shows the direction of the 
result. The column results sum up whether the hypothesis was confirmed (✓) or 
rejected (✕). 
There are some factors with a significant influence on the outcome of an out-
of-court restructuring. In particular, the size of the bank (H2), new credits (H4), an 
open and proactive communication policy (H5), a change in management (H6) and a 
capital contribution from existing shareholders (H7) have a significant positive 
influence on the outcome of corporate restructuring. In contrast, H3, on bank 
expertise, is not significant. 
As the results show, in our sample, a strong relationship with the main bank 
has no positive effect on the success of the restructuring. Therefore, H1 must be 
rejected. On the other hand, small banks are more successful in their support than 
larger ones. H2 can be confirmed. Very surprisingly and contrary to previous 
findings, the results show that expert banks are not more but in fact less successful in 
completing a workout than other banks. Therefore, H3 has to be rejected. Regarding 
the most popular measures in financial reorganization, debt forgiveness and new 
credit, we only find a significant positive effect for the latter. Debt forgiveness even 
reduces the probability of completing a workout successfully. Consequently, H4 can 
only be confirmed for new credit. Regarding internal measures and the 
communication strategy, we can confirm all the relevant hypotheses (H5 to H7). Open 
communication increases the probability of a successful negotiation, as do a change 
in management and a financial contribution from existing owners or shareholders to 
prove their commitment to the reorganization. 
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More detailed results show that relationship lending is less common in small 
banks (H2A significant, p = 0.000, but with the wrong sign; therefore H2A is not 
confirmed) and that within the different bank size groups, there is no significant 
correlation between relationship lending and success (small banks p = 0.138, other 
banks p = 0.112). 
 
Table 3: Bivariate results for influence on success 
 
Hypothesis 
Expected 
Influence 
p-
value 
Remark Result 
H1: strong relationship to main bank  
    (house bank) 
 0.028  ✕ 
H2: small banks  0.001  ✓ 
H3: bank with experience (expert bank)  0.149  ✕ 
H4: debt forgiveness  0.000  ✕ 
H4: new credit  0.000  ✓ 
H5: open and proactive communication  0.000  ✓ 
H6: change in management  0.001  ✓ 
H7: shareholder contribution  0.000  ✓ 
 
H4 to H7 each had two subhypotheses, one related to the correlation between 
house bank status and the particular variable of the hypothesis and one related to the 
variable’s influence on success within and outside of house banks: 
H4A: House banks are more willing to provide support in the form of debt 
forgiveness or the issuance of new credit. 
H4B: A house bank relationship is important for the availability of options 
such as debt forgiveness or the issuance of new credit and contributes to a successful 
reorganization. 
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H5A: Relationship lending is more likely to encourage open and proactive 
communication between a company and its bank. 
H5B: A house bank relationship is important for open and proactive 
communication and contributes to successful reorganization. 
 
H6A: A main bank is likely to encourage a change of management due to 
mutual trust and information exchange between company and bank. 
H6B: House bank status is important for initiating a management change and 
contributes to a successful reorganization. 
 
H7A: Shareholders are more willing to invest equity in a company that is in 
financial distress if it benefits from relationship lending. 
H7B: A house bank relationship is important for attracting shareholder 
contributions and contributes to a successful reorganization. 
 
Table 4 shows the various results for the correlations between the existence 
of a house bank relationship and the particular variable of the hypothesis ( for 
increasing,  for decreasing) and the one-sided p-value of Fisher’s exact test. For 
correlations with an unexpected sign, the "Remark” column shows the direction of 
the result. The "Result” column sums up whether the hypothesis was confirmed (✓) 
or rejected (✕). As the results show, there is no significant positive correlation 
between house bank status and the probability of a certain reorganization measure 
being implemented. The only positive, albeit nonsignificant, correlation can be found 
for the likelihood of receiving a financial contribution from existing shareholders. 
Therefore, H4A to H7A must be rejected. 
 
Table 4: Bivariate results for influence of house bank status 
 
Hypothesis 
Expected 
Influence 
p-
value 
Remark Result 
H4A: debt forgiveness  0.025  ✕ 
H4A: new credit  0.039  ✕ 
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H5A: open and proactive communication  0.014  ✕ 
H6A: change of management  0.000  ✕ 
H7A: shareholder contribution  0.390  ✕ 
 
To obtain more insight, hypotheses H4B to H7B are now assessed with data 
for two subgroups, namely, one group with house banks and the other without house 
banks. Table 5 shows the results for correlations between the particular variable of 
the hypothesis and reorganization success for both subgroups separately ( for 
increasing,  for decreasing) and the one-sided p-value of Fisher’s exact test. For 
correlations with an unexpected sign, the “Remark” column shows the direction of 
the result. The “Result” column sums up whether the hypothesis was confirmed (✓) 
or rejected (✕). As the results show, there are no major differences between house 
banks and other banks. For both groups, debt forgiveness has a negative influence on 
the success of the reorganization. For the other measures, there are no large 
differences between house banks and other banks. Only regarding the change in 
management variable is there a difference for house banks: House banks are 
obviously more successful in supporting management change than other banks. 
 
Table 5: Results for influence on success within/outside house banks 
 
 
Hypothesis 
Expected 
Influence 
p-
value 
Remark Result 
H4B: debt forgiveness     
 within house banks  0.003  ✕ 
 outside house banks  0.000  ✕ 
H4B: new credit     
 within house banks  0.002  ✓ 
 outside house banks  0.045  ✓ 
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H5B: 
open and proactive 
communication 
    
 within house banks  0.000  ✓ 
 outside house banks  0.000  ✓ 
H6B: change in management     
 within house banks  0.000  ✓ 
 outside house banks  0.484  ✕ 
H7B: shareholder contribution     
 within house banks  0.000  ✓ 
 outside house banks  0.000  ✓ 
 
As the very heterogeneous results in Table 3 to Table 5 show, the bivariate 
correlations are not completely satisfactory in providing a deep and comprehensive 
insights from the data. Therefore, in the next step, the various influencing factors are 
modeled by using a logistic regression with regard to the influence on the target 
variable (successful reorganization). Logistic regression is one of the methods used 
to examine the dependencies of a variable of interest on one or more independent 
variables. The method can thus be used to determine the change in the likelihood of 
an out-of-court reorganization being positively completed if various influencing 
factors interact. 
For variable selection, we used backward selection and a significance level of 
10 % to avoid being too careful and excluding too many variables. The pseudo-R 
squared statistic for the final model was 0.219 (Nagelkerke-R²). To interpret the 
results of the logistic regression in detail, the odds of the regression coefficients 
(Odds=EXP (B)) are used instead of the regression coefficient B. Table 6 now shows 
the final results of the logistic regression, including the regression coefficient B, the 
p-value, the odds, and a 95 % confidence interval for the odds. 
 
Table 6: Logistic regression – final model 
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Hypothesis 
Regression 
coefficient B 
p-
value 
Exp(B) 
95 % Confidence 
interval for EXP(B) 
House bank 
-.587 .007 .556 .363 .853 
Debt forgiveness 
-.878 .000 .416 .266 .649 
New loan 
.412 .084 1.509 .946 2.407 
Open and proactive 
communication 
1.146 .000 3.146 2.082 4.756 
Shareholder 
contribution 
.669 .002 1.951 1.266 3.008 
Constant .170 .464 1.186   
 
The final results of the regression show that house bank status 
(EXP(B)=0.556) in our sample does not increase but rather decreases the probability 
of a successful reorganization. Additionally, debt forgiveness (EXP(B)=0.416), an 
important financial measure in out-of-court reorganization, reduces the likelihood of 
success. The new loan measure has a positive impact on success. However, since it is 
significant only at a level of 10 %, this interpretation has to be drawn very cautiously. 
New loans can increase the likelihood of success by approximately 50 % 
(EXP(B) = 1.509). 
An open and proactive communication policy with the bank increases the 
probability of a successful out-of-court settlement by a factor of three 
(EXP(B) = 3.146) and is the strongest factor with the highest odds ratio. A 
contribution from existing shareholders doubles the probability of a successful 
restructuring (EXP(B) = 1.951) and therefore represents the second strongest 
influencing factor in our regression model. 
 
VI. Discussion and Recommendations 
A. Discussion 
In general, the findings indicate a high percentage of positive settlements in 
out-of-court reorganization. Sixty-two percent of the 658 analyzed bank-supported 
reorganization cases were successful. This confirms prior studies, indicating that 
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(bank-supported) workouts have high success rates and are more promising than 
formal reorganizations (Blazy et al., 2014; Couwenberg and Jong, 2006; Franks and 
Sussman, 2005; Jostarndt and Sautner, 2010). In view of banks’ role in the 
restructuring process, the present results are surprising. We could not identify a 
positive correlation between house bank status and the success of a reorganization. In 
contrast to the findings of Huang et al. (2013), a house bank relationship even reduces 
the probability of a successful reorganization. Consequently, the behavior of the 
analyzed house banks can be characterized as zombie lending that may artificially 
keep weak firms alive (Caballero et al., 2008). These new findings add to the existing 
literature and indicate that house banks, despite their relationship of trust, must be 
critical in their assessment of reorganization projects. In a similar vein, expert banks 
also have a reduced probability of a positive reorganization. With regard to the size 
of the companies studied, mostly SMEs, this may mean that expert banks are more 
used to working with larger companies. They may lack an understanding of SMEs 
(Decker, 2018). 
Regarding the positive correlation between a small bank size and the success 
of the reorganization, the results confirm the prior findings of Decker (2018) that 
small and regional banks are able to positively handle the reorganization of SMEs. 
With continued consolidation in the financial service industry the number of small 
banks is shrinking (Hardee, 2008). This can mean that small and medium-sized 
companies can no longer be given sufficient attention in the reorganization process. 
Regarding different reorganization measures, the results of the logistic 
regression show that new loans from the supporting bank, open and proactive 
communication between the firm and its bank and a financial contribution from 
existing shareholders significantly increase the probability of a positive 
reorganization. The findings indicate that the support of banks (with new credit) in 
combination with other measures makes a reorganization successful. This confirms 
prior findings from Couwenberg and Jong (2006) and Jostarndt and Sautner (2010). 
In our sample, the communication between a firm and its bank has the strongest 
impact on the outcome of the reorganization. Communication takes place face to face 
but also through the collection of information by the bank via monitoring (Jostarndt 
and Sautner, 2008; Micucci and Rossi, 2017), which yields an information advantage 
for the bank over other creditors (Blazy et al., 2014). Transparent and open 
communication is therefore the key to building trust and enhancing understanding 
and consequently motivating banks to support firms in distress. According to Decker 
(2018), trust and information are the basis for a stable lender-borrower relationship. 
Even though ongoing communication is necessary for a successful workout (Inoue et 
al., 2008; Micucci and Rossi, 2017), banks must not become negligent in their 
dealings with customers by artificially keeping weak firms alive. 
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Since the contribution from shareholders significantly increases the 
probability of a successful restructuring, we confirm prior results from Couwenberg 
and Jong (2006) and Jostarndt and Sautner (2008), who refer to the fact that banks 
guide firms in their restructuring effort. Obviously, owners can encourage banks to 
provide support through their own contribution, and the scope of reorganization 
measures is more important than the role or status of the bank. Nonetheless, the bank's 
willingness to provide support is a decisive factor for success in the restructuring 
process. 
B. Recommendations and Future Research 
Based on the empirical findings of this study, the following recommendations 
for corporate practice can be derived. 
Recommendation for entrepreneurs and managing directors of SMEs: An 
early reaction to financial distress is indispensable for sustainable corporate 
restructuring. Taking into account the specifics of the individual case, out-of-court 
restructuring can be a significant restructuring alternative to restructuring in court. 
Since the legal risks of an out-of-court reorganization are high in the case of failure, 
the involvement of consultants is strongly recommended for the reorganization 
review and the subsequent decision-making process. 
Recommendation for banks: Competent and active support of out-of-court 
restructuring serves all involved parties. According to the empirical findings, banks, 
alongside the firm owners, are the main stakeholders in out-of-court restructurings, 
especially those of SMEs (Blazy et al., 2014); (Jostarndt and Sautner, 2010). Since 
debt forgiveness is of only minor importance in out-of-court restructuring, banks are 
recommended to play an active role in restructuring. This is especially true for small 
and medium-sized enterprises, which do not receive as much attention from large 
banks (Hardee, 2008). Compared to formal reorganization, successful out-of-court 
restructurings lead to higher average satisfaction rates for banks (Franks and 
Sussman, 2005); (Jostarndt and Sautner, 2010), and banks’ financing risk can usually 
be reduced to a greater extent by active participation than by threats of legal 
proceedings.  
Recommendation for consultants of companies in crisis: Encourage rapid 
response to corporate crisis and ensure an objective view. In addition to legal 
advisors, external consultants, including chartered accountants, management 
consultants and restructuring managers, are regularly employed in crisis management 
and restructuring. A key task of consultants is to motivate entrepreneurs to react to a 
corporate crisis in a timely manner and to ensure an objective and holistic view of the 
initial situation. 
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Recommendation for legislators: The European Union Directive on 
"preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and 
on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, 
insolvency and discharge of debt" calls for a reform of national insolvency laws and 
other company laws to improve the framework conditions for out-of-court 
restructuring (European Commission, 2019). The objectives include ensuring 
qualified majorities for the adoption of a restructuring plan and supporting new 
financing during out-of-court restructuring by providing a "legal priority in payment". 
This requirement is emphasized on the basis of the empirical findings on the 
importance of restructuring financing from both banks and firm owners. Particularly 
in connection with the effects of the corona crisis, the timely implementation of the 
Directive is of particular importance. 
 
The present work has contributed to the knowledge of the factors influencing 
successful out-of-court restructuring. When interpreting the present study, however, 
the context of the investigation must always be taken into account. The results may 
be significantly influenced by the specific skills and institutional characteristics of the 
participating banks, such as size and organizational structure. In an international 
comparison, however, there is still relatively little empirical evidence on the (out-of-
court) restructuring of small and medium-sized enterprises. While experience shows 
that it is difficult to obtain data for SMEs, especially on the development of the asset, 
capital and liquidity situation from their annual financial statements, follow-up 
surveys can address these deficits, for example, by directly involving banks’ internal 
company analysis departments. In scientific research on out-of-court restructuring of 
SMEs, as in the present study, the focus is on the bank perspective through insights 
into or evaluation of bank files and information. Through qualitative studies, for 
example, using case studies, this view can be extended to include the perspectives of 
entrepreneurs, employees and other creditors. However, it should be pointed out in 
this context that information is usually handled very discreetly by all affected 
stakeholders regarding financial crises and restructuring. In previous studies, the 
short-term success of an out-of-court reorganization has usually been measured 
through the concluding of a reorganization agreement (Blazy et al., 2014); (Jostarndt 
and Sautner, 2008). However, the sustainable and long-term success of a 
reorganization can only be assessed after the agreed reorganization measures have 
been implemented appropriately and taking into account the economic situation of 
the restructured company (Mayr et al., 2017). Future research projects should 
therefore assess the long-term success of the reorganization and focus on the 
international comparison of the results. 
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